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On Getting First Things First:
Assessing Claims for the Primacy of Christ
Myk Habets
Abstract
Adopting modal logic the doctrine of the primacy of Christ is defined
and defended in relation to the Thomistic – Scotistic debates over
the primary and efficient causes of the incarnation. This leads to a
defence of the Scotistic thesis and a reserved affirmation for the Sco-
tistic hypothesis that there would have been an incarnation irrespec-
tive of the fall. This hypothesis is tested by reference to the work of
four recent theologians, Thomas Weinandy O.F.M. cap., Karl Barth,
Ju¨rgen Moltmann, and Thomas Torrance. Finally, a sketch describ-
ing another possible-world incarnation that builds upon the Scotistic
hypothesis is provided.
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I. Introduction
According to Christian tradition Jesus Christ is pre-eminent over all
creation as the Alpha and the Omega, the ‘beginning and the end’
(Rev 1.8, 21.6; 22.13). This belief, when theologically considered,
is known as the primacy of Christ.1 The specific issue this doctrine
addresses is the question: Was sin the efficient or the primary cause
of the incarnation? This essay seeks to model the practice of modal
logic in relation to the primacy of Christ, not to satisfy the cravings
of speculative theologians but to reverently penetrate the evangelical
mystery of the incarnation, specifically, the two alternatives: either
‘God became man independently of sin,’ or its contradiction, ‘God
became man because of sin’. Examining historical responses to the
1
‘Primacy’ is being used here to indicate the ‘state of holding the highest place or
rank within a given order, and/or the state of being logically or chronologically first,’ J.
Carol, Why Jesus Christ: Thomistic, Scotistic and Conciliatory Perspectives (Manassas,
VI.: Trinity Communications, 1986), p. 5.
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primacy of Christ will lead to a consideration of how some recent
theologians have taken up these themes and sought to develop them.
This in turn provides resources that contribute towards an understand-
ing of the incarnation assuming that the efficient cause was human
sin. Finally, an argument will be presented defending the primacy of
Christ and a justification for the hypothesis that there would have
been an incarnation of the Son irrespective of the fall.
II. Two worlds – one Christ
The specific question as to the primary reason for the incarnation has
been a staple theological issue in the West, coming to prominence in
medieval scholasticism.2 Medieval thinkers found the discussion of
counter-factual and counterpossible states of affairs to be particularly
useful tools for clarifying tricky theological questions. The practice,
however, has not found much support since. Contemporary theolo-
gians generally consider such speculative questions as too fanciful for
due consideration to be given to them. This contemporary contempt
for counter-factual questions is troublesome for it tends to constrain
theological imagination and rejects what can be a powerful teach-
ing tool, even heuristic device, enabling the theologian to penetrate
age-old questions from new perspectives. E.L. Mascall’s whimsical
advice is needed today more than ever, ‘Theological principles tend
to become torpid for lack of exercise, and there is much to be said for
giving them now and then a scamper in a field where the paths are
few and the boundaries undefined; they do their day-to-day work all
the better for an occasional outing in the country.’3 While theology
conducted within so-called post-modernity tends to view hypotheti-
cal speculation as excessive theorising this is not the case outside of
theology. Philosophy continues to work with notions of hypothetical
speculation, or more specifically, with ‘possible worlds semantics’
according to modal logic.4
Two views on the primacy of Christ dominate the discussion within
medieval theology, those of the Franciscans, led by John Duns Scotus,
and those of the Dominicans, led by Thomas Aquinas. According to
the first view humanity was created for glory, and sin is merely
an episode along the way. The incarnation would have occurred
2 See a review of the history of this discussion by O. Jager, ‘Is de incarnatie me´e´r dan
‘een noodmaatregel?,’’ in Rondom het Woord (10e jaargang 1, Jan., 1968), 73–76.
3 E.L. Mascall, Christian Theology and Natural Science (London: Green and Co, 1956),
p. 45.
4 See D. Lewis, Counterfactuals (Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973);
A. Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974); K. Konyn-
dyk, Introductory Modal Logic (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986);
and R.M. Adams, ‘Possible Worlds,’ The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd edn.
ed. R. Audi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 724.
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irrespective of the fall since humanity’s ultimate destiny is partic-
ipation in the being of God and the incarnation guarantees that this
will be realized. This Franciscan position is known as the Scotistic
thesis. It is what one scholar terms ‘elevation-line’ theology which
sees the incarnation as the way to the elevation or consummation
of creation.5 The second major view considers the deliverance of
creation as secondary to the question of sin. This is the Dominican
position known as the Thomistic thesis. It may be characterised as
a ‘restitution-line’ theology, in which the incarnation occurred solely
as a remedy for humanity’s sin, with the restitution of creation as a
corollary. Both ‘school’s’ of thought deserve some articulation before
examining some recent contributions to the issue.
Aquinas mentions the primacy of Christ on a number of occasions
and initially seems reluctant to take a stand on the issue.6 He writes
in his Summa theologiae:
There are different opinions about this question. For some say that even
if man had not sinned, the Son of Man would have become incarnate.
Others assert the contrary, and seemingly our assent ought rather to
be given to this opinion. For such things as spring from God’s will,
and beyond the creature’s due, can be made known to us only through
being revealed in the Sacred Scripture, in which the Divine Will is
made known to us. Hence, since everywhere in the Sacred Scripture
the sin of the first man is assigned as the reason of the Incarnation, it
is more in accordance with this to say that the work of the Incarnation
was ordained by God as a remedy for sin; so that, had sin not existed,
the Incarnation would not have been. And yet the power of God is
not limited to this; even had sin not existed, God could have become
incarnate.7
5 C.W. Suh, The Creation-Mediatorship of Jesus Christ: A Study in the Relation of the
Incarnation and the Creation (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1982).
6 He speaks of it in his Commentary on the Sentences (1253–1258), In III Sent., d. 1,
a. 3; in his Commentary on the First Epistle to Timothy, In 1 Tim., c. 1, lect. 4; and in the
most comprehensive and final form in the Summa theologiae, pt III, q. 1, art. 3.
7 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, pt III, q. 1, art. 3 (italics mine). The entire
section is important and should be considered. A few comments are in order. Aquinas is
adamant in the extended passage that God could have become incarnate even if Adam
had not sinned. Second, Aquinas states quite clearly that the opinion of an incarnation
non-contingent on the fall of Adam is plausible, but for his part, not probable. Third,
according to many Thomistic scholars, the entire tenor of Aquinas’ theology is not inher-
ently christocentric but theocentric. This means that it was not, according to Aquinas, the
original intention of God to sum up all things in Christ as the head of creation. This is
a post-lapsarian condition only. ‘That is to say, while there was first an order of grace
which did not include Christ, after the Fall such an order had its end in Christ, without
any substantial modification having intervened,’ F.X. Pancheri, The Universal Primacy of
Christ (Front Royal, Va.: 1984), p. 28, cited in J. Carol, Why Jesus Christ: Thomistic,
Scotistic and Conciliatory Perspectives (Manassas, VI.: Trinity Communications, 1986),
p. 11. This is what is known as the Thomistic thesis: the primary reason for the incarna-
tion was the fall of humanity thus there would not have been an incarnation of the eternal
Son had there been no sin to occasion it.
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Aquinas’s did not go much further in explicating his position. His dis-
ciples, however, did, drawing upon several lines of argument: scrip-
tural, historical, and logical. On Scriptural grounds it appears that
whenever a reason is assigned to the incarnation it is invariably the
sin of our first parent. Texts most cited include: Mt 1.21; 18.11;
20.28; Lk 5.32; 19.10; Jn 3.17; Rom 8.3; Gal 4.4–5; Heb 2.16–17;
10.3–12; and 1 Jn 3.5. In addition, certain Old Testament texts are
also appealed to. Most notable is the so-called proto-evangel of Gen
3.15, a promise which obviously presupposes Adam’s sin. In terms of
historical support Thomas and his supporters cite at least twenty-eight
fathers and ecclesiastical writers who seem to clearly state that God
became man for our salvation.8 Of these twenty-eight, half explicitly
declare that if Adam had not sinned, Christ would not have come.
While the array of supporters is impressive it is not clear whether
or not many of these thinkers mean that the sin of Adam was the
primary reason for Christ’s incarnation or simply one of the efficient
reasons, however important.
Carol summarily concludes his examination of the Thomistic thesis
with the words: ‘The quintessence of that teaching, however, remains
the common denominator uniting all Thomists, and it is simply this:
No sin, no Incarnation.’9 It is clear that the Thomistic thesis is
not limited to Dominicans. Many Protestants of the evangelical and
reformation traditions also hold this to be the only orthodox position,
citing the same texts, fathers, and arguments in support of the thesis
that sin is the primary reason for the incarnation. But there is another
option, the Scotistic thesis, and the force of this argument deserves
careful examination.
The Scotistic thesis that follows is the one advocated by John
Duns Scotus (d.1308), along with variations on his theory articulated
well beyond the pale of Franciscan theology. Discussing the primacy
of Christ within the context of his predestination Scotus introduces
the question as: Whether Christ was predestined to be the Son of
God? Scotus argues that the occasion for the predestination of Christ
was not supremely that of sin but rather the glory of God.10 Ac-
cording to Scotus the glory of God is a much higher good than the
8 See Carol, Why Jesus Christ, pp. 23–34; 35–41 and 81–85. Carol also includes
twenty-four contemporaries of Aquinas who agree with his thesis, and a further fourteen
authors in the 14th and 15th centuries. Carol then surveys eightyfour Thomists of the
seventeenth century, the most important include Joseph Ragusa (d.1624), Commentariorum
ac disputationum in Tertiam partem D. Thomae tomus unus sacra Incarnati Verbi mysteria
pertractans, q. 1, a. 3 and Gabriel Vazquez (d. 1604), In 111 Patrem Summae, q. 1, a. 3,
disp. X, c. IV-V.
9 Carol, Why Jesus Christ, p. 86.
10 See Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. III, d. 7, q. 3, Wadding edition (Lyons: 1939; reprinted
Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1968–69). For an overview see Suh, The Creation-
Mediatorship of Jesus Christ,13–33.
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redemption from sin. Consequently, to posit the incarnation solely on
the basis of human sin and the need for redemption is a diminution
of the incarnation. In his Ordinatio Scotus concisely summarises his
thesis:
I say that the incarnation of Christ was not foreseen as something
occasioned [by sin], but that it was foreseen by God from all eternity
and immediately as a good more proximate to the end. . .hence this is
the order followed in God’s prevision. First, God understood himself
as the highest good. In the second instant he understood all creatures.
In the third [instant] he predestined some to glory and grace, and
concerning some he had a negative act by not predestining. In the
fourth [instant] he foresaw that all these would fall in Adam. In the
fifth [instant] he preordained and foresaw the remedy – how they would
be redeemed through the Passion of his Son, so that, like all the elect,
Christ in the flesh was foreseen and predestined to grace and glory
before Christ’s Passion was foreseen as a medicine against the fall, just
as a physician wills the health of a man before he wills the medicine
to cure him.11
In the so-called Reportationes or Opus Parisiense, notes taken by
Scotus’s students, further elaboration and argumentation on his thesis
is provided. According to one student’s report we find that Scotus
views the greater good of the incarnation as follows (I have presented
this in the form of a signa rationis for convenience):
God loves himself.
God loves himself for others.
God wishes to be loved by him or her who can love Him with the
greatest love.
Only a theandric person could love God in this way.
The Son had to become incarnate for the reason of love before the
reason of salvation from sin.12
The Scotistic thesis on the primacy of Christ essentially comes
down to one word — love. The predestination of Christ is a com-
pletely gratuitous act of God. The corollary is that the incarnation is
not conditioned by any creaturely factor such as sin. This utter inde-
pendence from a creaturely factor is true in the case of all the elect.
Therefore, a fortiori, it must be true of the predestination of Christ
who, as head of the elect, was predestined to the greatest glory. The
basic reason given by the Scotists for the works of God ad extra is
the supreme love of God.
11 Scotus, Ordination, III (suppl.) d. 19; cod. Assisi com. 137, fol. 161v, cited in Carol,
Why Jesus Christ, 124–125, where Carol provides notes on the authenticity or otherwise
of this text. Whether it is Scotus’s work or not it is unquestionably Scotistic.
12 This is my paraphrase of the logic contained in Opus Parisiense, Lib. III, d. 7, q. 4,
cited in J. Carol, Why Jesus Christ, p. 127. For Carol’s elaboration of a Scotsitic signa
rationis see Why Jesus Christ, pp. 135–149.
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Integral to the Scotistic thesis, and a point which many consider
never to having been persuasively demolished, is the use of the ax-
iom ordinate volens, which states: ‘Everyone who wills ordinately
wills, immediately after the willing of an end, that which is more
immediate and more proximate with respect to the end,’13 and fur-
ther, ‘Everyone who wills reasonably first wills an end; second, that
which immediately attains the end; and third, other things that are
more remotely ordered to attaining the end.’14 J. Bissen concisely
states the axiom as follows:
God, who wills in orderly fashion, wills first that which is nearer
the end.
But the soul of Christ is nearer the end.
Therefore, God wills (predestines) Christ’s soul first.15
The ordinate volens axiom is considered by Scotists as an ir-
refutable argument in favour of Christ’s absolute predestination.16
A third feature of Scotus’s argument establishing the absolute pre-
destination of Christ is known as the ‘hierarchy of perfections’ (the
bonum occassionatum) and is worded as follows:
It does not seem that God predestined that soul [of Christ] to so great
a glory only on account of our redemption, since that redemption or
the glory of the redeemed soul is not so great a good as that glory
of Christ’s soul; nor is it likely that the greatest good among beings
would be merely occasioned on account of a lesser good; nor is it
13 Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. II, d. 20, q. 2, n.2, Wadding edn. (Lyons: 1639, reprinted,
Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1968–69), 6.2:822.
14 Scotus, Ordinatio Lib. III, d. 32, n. 6 Wadding edn. 7.2:692.
15 J. Bissen, De praedestinatione absoluta Christi secundum Duns Scotum exposition
doctrnalis, in Antonianum 12 (1937), 11, cited in Carol, Why Jesus Christ, p. 235.
16 In a provocative statement Carol, Why Jesus Christ, p. 254, goes so far as to assert
that: For our part. . .we submit that if St. Thomas had lived long enough to examine the
reasons marshalled by Duns Scotus in defense of his thesis, the Angelic Doctor would have
enthusiastically embraced it; and this for the very good reason that the Franciscan vision
is eminently grounded on the principles of the philosophia perennis which he himself has
so brilliantly championed.
When Aquinas says that ‘the less noble is for the sake of the more noble’ (Aquinas,
Summa theologia, I, q. 65, a. 2), or ‘the imperfect is for the sake of the more perfect’
(Aquinas, Summa theologia, I, q. 105, a. 5), he is saying that the more noble and more
perfect is always the final cause properly so-called of the less noble and less perfect. Since
Jesus Christ is unquestionably the most perfect and noble in the entire hierarchy of creation
– the Opus summum Dei, as Scotus styled him (Scotus, Opus Paris, III, d. 7, q. 4) – we
must conclude that Jesus Christ is the final cause of all creation, that everything has been
created for his sake, as Col 1.16 teaches. Aquinas also taught that ‘the better a thing is in
its effects, the greater its priority in the intention of the agent’ (Aquinas, Summa Contra
gentes, lib. 2, c. 44, a. 1). Owing to the intrinsic dignity and excellence of the hypostatic
union, the man Jesus Christ must have been ontologically first in the mind of the Agent.
And if he is first, then he must also be the cause of all those that follow, according to the
other metaphysical axiom stated by Aquinas, ‘That which is first in any genus is the cause
of all that follow’ (Aquinas, Summa theologia, III, q. 56, a. 1).
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likely that He [God] preordained Adam to such a good before He
predestined Christ, which is what would follow.17
This is an oft-repeated point within Scotus’s theory and the logic
is relatively simple to follow: if Christ was primarily intended for our
redemption then he would be a bonum occassionatum. Since Christ
is a greater good by far than humanity’s redemption it is not likely
that God would have predestined him primarily and essentially for
something which is of far less value. Why the insistence on this line
of argument? To counter a logical conclusion of the Thomistic thesis
that if the incarnation was primarily due to the fall of Adam then
the life of Christ and the merits incurred by the incarnation are all
a result of sin and so Adam should be thanked for falling and sin
become an occasion of rejoicing.
A final argument used in the Scotistic thesis is the Scriptural testi-
mony. The following texts are most commonly cited in support: Prov
8.22–23; Col 1.13–20; Eph 1.3–10; Rom 8.29–30; and 1 Pt 1.20.
From Romans 8.29–30 Scotists conclude that if Jesus Christ is the
exemplar or model which God planned to reproduce in humanity,
Christ’s existence must therefore be, in God’s mind, ordine inten-
tionis, prior to the existence of all other persons, including Adam,
because the exemplatum always presupposes the exemplar. The spe-
cific exemplatum in this text is not the eternal Word, but Christ the
God-man, the same who died and came back to life and now in-
tercedes at God’s right hand (v34). Casting ones net wider, those
who hold to the Scotistic thesis on the primacy of Christ aver that
reasons for the incarnation other than redemption include at least the
following: ‘I have come that they may have life and have it more
abundantly’ (Jn 10.10); ‘I have glorified you on earth; I have car-
ried out the mission you gave me to do’ (Jn 17.4); ‘The reason I
was born, the reason why I came into the world is to testify to the
truth’ (Jn 18.37); and ‘He has sent me to bring the good news to the
poor, to proclaim liberty to captives and to the blind new sight, to
set the downtrodden free, to proclaim the Lord’s year of favour’ (Lk
4.18–19).18
The sine quo non of the Scotistic thesis is that the predestination
of Christ took place in an instant which was logically prior to the
prevision of sin as absolutum futurum. That is, the existence of Christ
was not contingent on the fall as foreseen through the scientia visio-
nis.19 In order to be aligned to the Scotistic thesis an acceptance of
one or more of the following affirmations is needed:
17 Scotus, Ordinatio, Lib. III, d. 7, q. 3, cited in Carol, Why Jesus Christ, p. 246.
18 For commentary on these and other verses see Carol, Why Jesus Christ, p. 168.
19 This point is made clear by Carol, Why Jesus Christ, 147.
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that the incarnation was necessary to impart creatures the su-
pernatural knowledge of God;
that the angels and Adam in the state of innocence were sanc-
tified in virtue of the future merits of Christ;
that Lucifer fell because he rejected the grace of Christ;
that the God-man was the first of the predestined;
that Christ is the goal or end of all creation;
or that Christ was the model God had in mind when he decided
to create the world.
This way of presenting the Scotistic thesis has the advantage that it
presents Christ as redeemer in the very first logical instant in which
his existence is efficaciously decreed by God.20
In a balance-sheet of 1486 theologians from the thirteenth to the
twentieth century Carol highlights those who are either pro-Thomistic
or pro-Scotistic regarding the primacy of Christ.21 His dossier is by
no means exhaustive but Carol contends that out of 1486 thinkers,
614 hold to the Thomistic thesis, broadly conceived, and 1179 to the
Scotistic thesis.22 Not that all advocates of the Scotistic thesis agree
with every aspect of that theory. Most explicitly affirm that Christ’s
predestination was decreed independently of the fall. That makes
them, according to the criteria above, authentic Scotists. A second
group affirms that Christ was willed or predestined first, or before any
other creature. That makes them mitigated Scotists. The impression
given by many contemporary theologians that the Thomistic thesis is
the only expression of orthodoxy is clearly incorrect.
There is clearly and importantly a difference between the Scotistic
thesis and the Scotistic hypothesis. The thesis is the absolute and
universal primacy of Christ, his unconditional predestination, and
his final causality over all creation. The hypothesis argues for the
existence of Christ even if Adam had not sinned.23 This hypothetical
20 This modified or ‘neo-Scotist’ position is adapted from the works of W.H. Marshner,
A Logician’s Reflections on the Debitum Contrahendi Peccatum, in Marian Studies 29
(1978), and Marian Studies 30 (1980), pp. 187–189; J.F. Bonnefoy, Christ and the Cos-
mos (Paterson: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1965); and M. Meilach, The Primacy of Christ
(Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1964).
21 There are a variety of intermediate views which fall somewhere between the Thomistic
and Scotistic theses, most notably those of Luis Molina (d. 1601), Commentaria in Primam
Divi Thomae Partrem. . ., q. XXIII, a. IV-V, disp, I. membr. VII-VIII, ed. Venetiis (1594), I,
333–339; Francisco Sua´rez (d. 1617), de Incarnatione, disp. V, sect. 4, n. 4, Opera omnia,
XVII, ed. Vive`s (Paris, 1860), 239; and Gesualdo M. Rocca and Gabriel M. Roschini, de
ratione primaria existentiae Christi et Deiparae (Romae, 1944).
22 Carol, Why Jesus Christ, 466.
23 Scotus was an advocate of and master at modal logic so it is no wonder he applied his
thesis to an equally logical hypothesis. See C.G. Normore, ‘Duns Scotus’s Modal Theory,’
in The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, ed. T. Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003), pp. 129–160.
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position can be denied while still upholding the Scotistic thesis, as
we shall see in several contemporary advocates of this position.
III. Contemporary restatements
Having considered the two historical positions on the issue of the
primacy of Christ, the Thomistic and the Scotistic, we are now in a
position to assess several contemporary thinkers on the issue in order
to draw some theological conclusions of our own. While strictly
denying any hypothesis that there would have been an incarnation of
the eternal Son even had there been no fall, Fr Thomas Weinandy
O.F.M. Cap. upholds the Scotistic thesis on the absolute primacy of
Christ.24 Weinandy is a Franciscan monk and a Thomistic scholar,
placing him in an ideal position to see the merits of both sides of
the traditional debate. Weinandy is also a member of the Mother
of God Community who’s five point mission statement includes a
commitment to ‘witness to the primacy of Christ, the firstborn of all
creation’.25
Fr Weinandy believes a via media in this debate can be found
through a return to the place of Jesus Christ in history; he is the
‘cosmic Christ’ precisely because he defeated sin, Satan, and death.26
To support this position Fr Weinandy appeals to the christological
hymn of Col 1.15–20, which he notes was also Scotus’s theological
inspiration.27 This hymn, along with others in the New Testament,
appeals to the primacy of the cosmic Christ on the basis of who he
is and what he has done. ‘Our approach has been wholly biblical and
historical, and thus in keeping with Aquinas’s concerns. At the same
time, it has upheld Scotus’s insight that the supremacy of Jesus was
first in the Father’s mind,’28 writes Fr Weinandy. He further argues
that ‘these valid convictions of Aquinas and Scotus form parts of a
deeper and more central truth – the primacy of the Incarnate Son,
24 T.G. Weinandy, In the Likeness of Sinful Flesh: An Essay on the Humanity of Christ
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1993), 135–148; and ‘The Cosmic Christ,’ The Cord 51 no.1
(2001), 27–38.
25 See http://www.motherofgod.org/ (accessed 26.7.06).
26 The topic has been treated in G.C. Berkouwer, The Work of Christ (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1965), 19–34, who rejects the idea outright on similar grounds to Weinandy.
Berkouwer argues that the Scotistic hypothesis separates the incarnation from the cross
and results in a diminishment of the latter.
27 Col 1.15–20 is considered by many exegetes to be the locus classicus for the cos-
mological aspect of christology or the mediatorship of Jesus Christ. See a critical exegesis
and survey of different interpretations of this text in relation to our present concern in
Suh, The Creation-Mediatorship of Jesus Christ, 255–290. Other significant texts cited by
Weinandy include Eph 1.3–14; Phil 2.5–11; and the Book of Revelation.
28 Weinandy, ‘The Cosmic Christ,’ p. 37.
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as the Cosmic Christ, is achieved and most fully manifested in the
cross.’29
While Fr Weinandy believes a third way is tenable following Fran-
cis of Assisi what is actually presented is, if we apply Carol’s criteria
to Weinandy’s work, a basic Scotistic thesis that highlights the effi-
cient cause of the incarnation, sin, while upholding the primary cause,
the glory of Jesus Christ. While rejecting any hypothetical approach
to the issue and despite assertions to the contrary, Fr Weinandy sup-
ports the traditionally conceived Scotistic thesis. As he writes, ‘We
suggest that we were created, in accordance with the Father’s will, to
witness the glory of Jesus and to praise him eternally for his glory,’30
and again, ‘the principal reason the Father created the world in all its
magnificent variation was to give glory to his incarnate Son, Jesus
Christ.’31 What Fr Weinandy does contribute in his brief accounts is
the added dimension of pneumatology. According to Fr Weinandy:
the primary task of the Holy Spirit is to gather the whole cosmic order
into union with Christ and to empower all human beings, from Adam
and Eve to the last person conceived, to confess Jesus Christ is Lord.
Such a Spirit-filled profession of faith is to the Father’s glory, for this
is the supreme desire of his paternal heart.32
It is this element of pneumatology which has hitherto been missing
in the historic discussions concerning the primacy of Christ.33 While
Fr Weinandy has much to offer regarding the trinitarian procession
and mission of the Holy Spirit, he has not yet applied these insights
directly to the issue of the primacy of Christ.34
The doctrine of the primacy of Christ finds a place within Protes-
tant theology as well.35 Karl Barth presents Jesus Christ as the
Mediator between Creator and creation, between heaven and earth,
29 Weinandy, ‘The Cosmic Christ,’ p. 37.
30 Weinandy, In the Likeness of Sinful Flesh, p 137.
31 Weinandy, ‘The Cosmic Christ,’ p. 27.
32 Weinandy, ‘The Cosmic Christ,’ p. 27.
33 See M. Habets, ‘Spirit Christology: Seeing in Stereo,’ Journal of Pentecostal Theology
11 no. 2 (2003), pp. 199–235.
34 For his trinitarian contributions see especially The Father’s Spirit of Sonship: Recon-
ceiving the Trinity (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995).
35 See J. Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion (1559), ed. J.T. McNeill, trans.
F.L. Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), 1.15.3; 2.12.1; 2.12.4. It appears
that Calvin believed the sin of humanity was not the primary cause of the incarnation
but rather the efficient cause, thus making him sympathetic to the broad Scotistic thesis
outlined here, while firmly rejecting the Scotistic hypothesis of an incarnation irrespective
of the fall. According to Calvin the primary reason for the incarnation was to glorify the
Father in the Son and to bridge the epistemic and ontological divide between Creator and
creature. This view of Calvin is confirmed when, in 2.12.1, we read: ‘The situation would
surely have been hopeless had the very majesty of God not descended to us, since it was
not in our power to ascend to him. . .Even if man had remained free from all stain, his
condition would have been too lowly for him to reach God without a Mediator.’
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between eternity and time.36 While time and eternity are distinct,
they are not separated in the person of the incarnate Son.37 Hun-
singer points out that for Barth the fellowship of time and eternity in
the person of Jesus Christ has two vectors, one from above-to-below,
and one from-below-to above. He then cites Athanasius’s famous
statement, ‘God became human in order that humans might become
gods’ to illustrate how Barth conceives of the simultaneity of these
two vectors in Christ.38 God’s becoming human without ceasing to
be divine corresponds to the downward vector, while humankind’s
elevation to God without ceasing to be human corresponds to the up-
ward vector. The emphasis of this upward vector in Barth’s theology
places him squarely within the ‘elevation-line’ theology emphatic in
the Scotistic tradition.
According to Barth’s theology, the primacy of Christ is considered
in relation to the doctrine of time and eternity.39 Through the incar-
nation the eternal Son took to himself time without succumbing to
time. Accordingly, Christ recreates and heals time.40 It is important
to notice that the redemption of time is distinct from salvation from
sin. As Hunsinger explains: ‘Time’s wounds, as here set forth, are in-
herent in the good creation. They may be exacerbated and corrupted
by sin, but they are not identical with it, nor are they hostile to
God. When measured by eternity, they are merely imperfections, not
corruptions.’41 Does this provide us with an affirmative answer from
Barth as to whether or not there would have been an incarnation ir-
respective of the fall? According to Hunsinger’s reading, while Barth
remained cautious on the hypothetical structure of the question he did
approach the position of Scotus when he affirmed that ‘among other
things, the incarnation resolves a plight logically independent of sin,
namely, the plight of transitoriness and dissolution into nonbeing.’42
36 K. Barth, Church Dogmatics. 4 vols. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1956–1975), II/1,
616. (Hereafter CD.)
37 In Jesus Christ eternity and time have a ‘fellowship’ (koinonia) with one another.
Barth, CD II/1, 616.
38 G. Hunsinger, ‘Mysterium Trinitatis: Karl Barth’s Conception of Eternity,’ in Disrup-
tive Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), p. 202.
39 See an overview of Barth’s theology of time and eternity in CD II/1, pp. 608–640.
40 According to Barth eternity corresponds to perfection, and time with imperfection.
Eternity is the perfect archetype and prototype of time, whereas time is merely the imperfect
copy of eternity. This is explained in Hunsinger, ‘Mysterium Trinitatis,’ p. 198. See an
overview of Barth’s theology of time and eternity in CD II/1, pp. 608–640.
41 Hunsinger, ‘Mysterium Trinitatis,’ p. 204.
42 Hunsinger, ‘Mysterium Trinitatis,’ p. 204. Hunsinger goes on to comment that ‘He
does so, however, in a remarkably Thomistic way. Although Barth disagreed with the
standard Thomistic understanding of nature and grace as applied to sin, he agreed with
it as applied to transitoriness. Barth agreed with Aquinas, in other words, that in the
work of healing time, grace does not destroy nature, but rather perfects and exceeds it’
(pp. 204–205).
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While Barth never takes an open stand on the issue of whether or
not there would have been an incarnation without the fall he often
seems to imply that this would have been the case.
It is clear that while reticent over the Scotistic hypothesis Barth
is committed to the Scotistic thesis but for his own reasons. In
his trinitarian construction of time and eternity Barth starts with
the pretemporal existence of the triune God. In this pretemporal
existence God is in perfect fellowship as Father, Son and Holy
Spirit.
And in this pure divine time there took place the appointment of the
eternal Son for the temporal world, there occurred the readiness of the
Son to do the will of the eternal Father, and there ruled the peace of
the eternal Spirit – the very thing later revealed at the heart of created
time in Jesus Christ.
He continues:
To say that everything is predestined, that everything comes from
God’s free, eternal love which penetrates and rules time from eternity
is just the same as to say simply that everything is determined in Jesus
Christ.43
This quotation provides a forceful articulation of Barth’s commit-
ment to the Scotistic thesis, even if he does not directly term it as
such. The predestination of Christ is explicitly linked to the will of
the triune God in the ‘pure divine time,’ which is clearly before any
consideration of sin or the fall.
Barth’s theology of covenant and creation is also informative re-
garding his position on the primacy of Christ.44 A Reformed teaching
on creation-covenant-fall is reversed by Barth to covenant-creation-
fall.45 From within God’s ‘pure divine time’ a covenant was estab-
lished by which God’s ecstatic being of love decided to create a
counterpoint, an imago Dei in a creaturely realm.46 Human beings
are created to fulfil the prior covenant of God. In the covenant God
aims at uniting himself with the creature and at elevating its being by
letting it participate in his own being.47 Barth is thus committed to
an ‘elevation-line’ theology which sees the incarnation as the way to
the consummation of creation. We may summarise Barth’s position
with the following from Suh:
43 Barth, CD II/1, p. 622.
44 Other arguments in favour of Barth’s support for the Scotistic thesis would include:
1) the eternal election of the man Jesus Christ and his theology on the ‘humanity of God,’
2) the epistemological and ontological barriers Barth considers need to be bridged and can
only be achieved by Jesus Christ, and 3) Barth’s incarnational christology.
45 See the discussion in Suh, The Creation-Mediatorship of Jesus Christ, p. 38.
46 This is developed throughout Barth, CD III/1, pp. 94–228.
47 This is developed throughout Barth, CD III/1, pp. 42–329.
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Before the foundation of the world the reconciliation or the union of
God with His creatures was intended. God concluded His covenant
with His creatures for this purpose. The first thought in God’s counsel
from eternity is His union with the creatures and then their eleva-
tion which implies their participation in His being. The creation was
planned and brought about for the sake of reconciliation. One of the
underlying ideas in Barth’s theological arguments is that the first cre-
ation is imperfect in itself. Therefore, the creation should be elevated
to perfection through the grace of God. If seen in this perspective, rec-
onciliation is not said to be made necessary because of sin or the fall,
which is an episode or incident. The reconciliation which is connected
with sin is included in the scheme of elevation. . .If sin would not have
entered into the world and the covenant would have proceeded to its
original goal, then it would have resulted in the elevation of the created
being through the union of God with it.48
The work of reconciliation in Jesus Christ is the accomplishment of
the union between God and humanity which God originally willed
and created. This salvation as the fulfilment of being is not, as Suh
also points out, ‘inherent to the created being but comes from God
to it, because it is the participation in the being of God. . .It is the
free grace of God. God created man to be the participant in His
being.’49 Jesus Christ is the Mediator and the Reconciler, not only
in the juridical sense to take away the sin of the world, but in the
broader sense of uniting humanity with God, the original intention of
the covenant. Seen in this perspective, the fall and sin is an episode
or incident, according to Barth.50 This reading of Barth’s theology
confirms his implicit commitment to a Scotistic thesis on the primacy
of Christ.
Another contemporary theologian who has considered the issue
of the primacy of Christ is Ju¨rgen Moltmann. Moltmann asserts,
‘So “the Son of God would have become man even if the human
race had remained without sin.” That is how we should have to an-
swer the question, if we wanted to embark on empty speculation.’51
How does he come to this assertion? Moltmann considers whether
or not from God’s perspective the incarnation is fortuitous or neces-
sary; is it based on God’s will or God’s nature? The first response
Moltmann identifies with those who argue the incarnation is merely
48 Suh, The Creation-Mediatorship of Jesus Christ, 66. Suh bases this largely upon his
reading of Barth, CD IV/1, pp. 22–66.
49 Suh, The Creation-Mediatorship of Jesus Christ, p. 69.
50 Barth, CD IV/1, p. 37.
51 Moltmann, Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God (San Francisco: Harper
and Row, 1981), p. 116. Moltmann does not mention Aquinas or Scotus directly but
traces the question immediately back to J. Mu¨ller, ‘Ob der Sohn Gottes Mensch geworden
sein wu¨rde, wenn das menschliche Geschlecht ohne Su¨nde geblieben ware?’ Texte zur
Kirchen-und Theologiegeschichte, ed. J. Wirsching (Gu¨ttersloh, 1968).
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an ‘emergency measure’ on God’s part, taken in order to counter the
crisis of sin in the world. The second response sees the incarnation
belonging to the eternally self-communicating love of God himself.
According to Moltmann, the first view, that of the Thomistic thesis,
conceives of the incarnation as merely the functional presupposition
for the atoning sacrifice made necessary by sin. This is, Moltmann ar-
gues, an expression of the saving will of God outwards. The problem
Moltmann has with this view is that God himself is then unaffected
by the incarnation. ‘Once the incarnate Son of God has achieved the
reconciliation of the world with God, he himself becomes superflu-
ous.’52 Moltmann goes further: ‘Once creation has been redeemed,
purified from sin and liberated from death, the God-Man no longer
has any place in it. Any functional and merely soteriological Chris-
tology is manifestly on the wrong track, simply because it abolishes
itself in this way.’53 Moltmann thus mounts a powerful critique of
the Thomistic thesis.54
The view Moltmann advocates is that the incarnation was necessary
given the nature of God as grace and love. The love of God is prior
to the occasion of expressing it. The occasion (occasio) was sin and
the fall but the reason (causa) was the being and nature of God.
52 Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, p. 115.
53 Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, p. 115. We see this view explicitly affirmed
in the work of A. Van Ruler who conceives the incarnation as God’s emergency measure.
The incarnation is thus exclusively a means for the restoration of the fallen creation. When
the goal is achieved, the means is no longer needed. The conclusions of Van Ruler are that
the incarnation will be liquidated in the eschaton. See A.A. Van Ruler, ‘De Verhouding
can het kosmologische en het eschatologische element in de Christolgie,’ in Theologisch
Werk (Nijkerk: G.F. Callenbach, 1969), deel I, p. 165; De evolutie van het dogma: ThW
II, p. 53; Theologie van het apostat, p. 32; Die Christliche Kirche und das Alte Testament,
p. 65. All citations from Suh, The Creation Mediatorship of Jesus Christ, p. 212 (see
pp. 212–235 for a full commentary on Van Ruler’s position).
Moltmann specifically critiques this position of Van Ruler in his The Crucified God:
The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology (New York:
Harper and Row, 1974), pp. 259–262. Interestingly, Moltmann sees this same tendency, this
same ‘functional Christology,’ in the theology of John Calvin. While grossly overstated
Moltmann argues that for Calvin once redemption has been completely mediated in the
eschaton, and all things are handed back to the Father by the Son, then there will no longer
be need for mediation so the Mediator – Jesus Christ – retreats back into the Trinity and
direct communion with God (trinity) is achieved (see J. Calvin, Commentary on Paul’s First
Epistle to the Corinthians, 15.28). J. Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as
the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology (New York: Harper and Row, 1974),
pp. 257–259. Further, Moltmann reads Dorothy So¨lle (Christ the Representative [SCM,
1967]) in the same vein. Based on his reading of So¨lle Moltmann believes that when
the function of representation, which is inherently for a limited time, is exhausted in the
eschaton, then too the representative will be exhausted.
54 Moltmann does not mention Aquinas or Scotus directly but traces the question im-
mediately back to J. Mu¨ller, ‘Ob der Sohn Gottes Mensch geworden sein wu¨rde, wenn
das menschliche Geschlecht ohne Su¨nde geblieben ware?’ Texte zur Kirchen-und Theolo-
giegeschichte, ed. J. Wirsching (Gu¨ttersloh, 1968). See Moltmann, The Trinity and the
Kingdom, p. 115, fn.28.
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If this is carried through into our understanding of the incarnation
then once the reason for the expression of love has ceased, sin, the
cause of that love and so love itself does not cease. God is still free
to love and because God is love, the love of God will continue to
be expressed on his creatures even after full redemption has been
accomplished.55 In addition, the ultimate expression of God’s love in
Jesus Christ will endure for eternity.
Moltmann’s theology revolves around the point that the eternal Son
did not become man simply due to the fall but rather for the sake
of perfecting creation. It is thus necessary for God if he wishes to
achieve his covenantal intentions. Moltmann makes it explicit that by
necessary he does not mean absolutely. ‘The incarnation of the Son
is neither a matter of indifference for God nor is it necessary for his
divinity.’ Rather, if God is love then it is his nature to be ecstatic,
to love the Triune members and his creation, not only to love his
“like” but also to love his “other.”’56 Moltmann then constructs a
convincing argument that Jesus Christ is the image of God while
men and women are images of Christ. It is therefore in fellowship
with the incarnate Son that believers discover the truth of human
existence. Accordingly, the incarnation of the Son has a significance
of its own. ‘But if God’s world is designed for men and women,
and if the incarnation of the Son fulfils this design of creation, then
in intention the incarnation precedes the creation of the world. The
fact that the eternal Son of the Father becomes God’s created ikon
then belongs to his eternal destiny.’57 As with Barth, Moltmann does
not appeal directly to the Franciscan school of thought but he clearly
reflects the Scotistic thesis.
What Moltmann adds to the traditional discussion on the primacy
of Christ is the suggestion that love, God as love, is a primary reason
for the incarnation and that if the Scotistic model is not endorsed
then the eternality of the incarnate Son is called into question. He
thus furthers the discussion on the primacy of Christ in meaningful
ways.
In his magnum opus Thomas Torrance, the final theologian who’s
ideas we shall examine, declares that in light of the eternal purposes
of God, and the proleptic nature of creation conditioned as it is by
the incarnation, and:
[w]hile clapping our hands on our mouth, without knowing what we
say, we may nevertheless feel urged to say that in his eternal purpose
the immeasurable Love of God overflowing freely beyond himself
which brought the creation into existence would have become incarnate
55 Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, p. 116.
56 Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, p. 117.
57 Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, p. 117.
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within the creation even if we and our world were not in need of his
redeeming grace.58
This corresponds remarkably to much that we have already examined
in Scotus, Barth, and Moltmann.
From a detailed reading of his theology it is clearly evident that
Torrance is committed to a view of the primacy of Christ that is
Scotistic in its orientation. At least four main arguments can be
employed to support this reading.59 In the first instance, Torrance
has spent considerable time developing an account of the ontological
necessity of the atonement given the Creator — creature distinction.
In order for this ontological barrier to be broached God himself had
to become human without ceasing to be divine in order to raise
humanity up to participate in the Triune communion. This was only
possible in Christ and by the Holy Spirit. This distinction has nothing
to do with sin in the first instance. To be sure, once Adam and Eve
did sin, however original sin is conceived, the rest of their progeny
was affected so that now, in the only world we know, the ontological
divide has been broadened by sin, but it was not originally occasioned
by it.
A second line of reasoning for Torrance’s Scotistic theology is
the recognition of an epistemological barrier between humanity and
God. Torrance has made it clear on numerous occasions that a saving
knowledge of God is not ‘natural’ to human persons. In his Auburn
Lectures we read:
58 T.F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being Three Persons (Edinburgh:
T & T Clark, 1996), p. 210. In his Auburn Lectures at the start of his academic career
Torrance had asserted the direct opposite to this. See T.F. Torrance, The Doctrine of Jesus
Christ: Auburn Lectures 1938–39 (Eugene, Or.: Wipf & Stock, 2002), p. 154. His thought
thus developed considerably in this area, largely due to his later interest in Athanasian
theology, contingency, and the vicarious humanity of Jesus Christ.
59 More points could be added such as the redemption of time, for example. But we
have limited the discussion here to the main emphases of Torrance’s theology. One other
argument necessitating Torrance’s broadly Scotistic position is his use of the concept of
contingency. Contingency plays a major part in Torrance’s scientific dogmatics and so
it should not be a surprise that contingency is linked to modal logic in philosophical
reasoning which itself is linked to possible worlds semantics. Torrance has said the world
is contingent simply because God did not need to create it. This immediately presupposes
that there is more than one possible world. If God could choose to create or not to create,
then there are at least two possible worlds: the world in which God does create this
particular universe and the one in which he does not. A logical corollary of accepting
divine contingency is a commitment to the Scotistic thesis. In Torrance’s work after the
1960’s we see him working out the scientific structures of theology more rigorously than
he could have anticipated in his early Auburn Lectures. If one had the opportunity to ask
Thomas Torrance if what is happening in philosophy today with its interest in essentialism
is what his own scientific dogmatics had anticipated would he reply positively in the way
Barth did when Torrance pointed out to him how contemporary science conformed to
Barth’s own theological science, even though he was unaware of it at the time? See J.W.
Richards, The Untamed God: A Philosophical Exploration of Divine Perfection, Simplicity
and Immutability (Downers Grove: IVP, 2003), 82–105.
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It is sometimes asked if God cannot reveal himself to us without Christ,
without this form known to us which he assumed. The answer to that
is that if the revelation of God were to take place apart from this
veiling in human being or in the form of another being whose form
was unknown to us in our world, it would mean the disruption of the
conditions of this world and of mankind – it would mean the end of
all things. It would mean impossibility! It is the authentic Humanity
of the Lord Jesus Christ which betokens real possibility in our world
of human being and space and time.60
According to Torrance’s christology the incarnation of the Son was
an absolute necessity – not for God but for revelation and reconcilia-
tion. And it is precisely in the form of a human being that the divine
person must be revealed. According to Torrance divine revelation
and reconciliation occur together in a two-way movement between
God and humanity. In reaching an understanding of God as triune
we have to take into account not only our drawing near to God but
God’s drawing near to us in and through the self-humiliation of the
Son in the incarnation. It is within the conditions of full humanity
that God has made himself known to us. While these points are evi-
dent in Barth and Moltmann they are made more central in Torrance’s
theology.
The reality of Christ’s homoousia connects the economic Trinity
with the immanent Trinity, thus we conclude that according to Tor-
rance’s logic, the primary reason for the incarnation was for the Son
to glorify the Father by bringing all creation into ontological and
epistemological communion with the triune God. This is simply to
apply one of Torrance’s axioms: ‘Since only God can really know
God, we may know him only as he reveals himself to us through
himself.’61 The Father-Son relationship is so intrinsic to an under-
standing of God that Torrance can assert:
[T]here is a closed circle of knowing between the Father and the Son
and the Son and the Father. The Father and the Son are inherently and
reciprocally related with one another in God in such an exclusive way
that there is no knowledge of the Son except that of the Father, and no
knowledge of the Father except that of the Son, unless a way is freely
opened up by the Son for us to share in the communion of knowing
within God himself.62
‘This is precisely what may happen,’ writes Torrance, ‘through the
revealing activity of Jesus Christ the incarnate Son’63 and through
the communion of the Holy Spirit who is God and dwells in God.
60 Torrance, The Doctrine of Jesus Christ, p. 137. With this quotation we find a hint as
to the necessity of the incarnation due to creational space-time.
61 Torrance, The Mediation of Christ, p. 115. Italics in original.
62 Torrance, The Mediation of Christ, p. 116.
63 Torrance, The Mediation of Christ, pp. 116–117.
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Torrance argues forcefully and convincingly that only by means of
the incarnation of the Son and the conjoint activity of the Holy Spirit
is knowledge of God, and so union with God, possible.
A third area which necessitates identifying Torrance’s theology
with the Scotistic thesis is his stress on the saving significance of
the incarnation. Torrance shows how the incarnation is redemptive
and he does this by utilising both an Eastern Orthodox strategy of
articulating the positive features of the incarnation, what we are saved
for,64 along with McLeod Campbell’s emphasis on the prospective
aspects of the incarnation.65 Torrance’s theology thus lends itself in
support of the Scotistic thesis and hypothesis, the former asserted
positively and the latter asserted tentatively. The incarnation involves
the transformation of men and women into glorified saints; something
inherent within God’s will to create in the first instance. Conformity
to the incarnate Son was and is the divine intention for men and
women regardless of human sinfulness.
One final argument can be offered for how Torrance’s theology is
consonant with both the primacy of Christ as referring to something
other than sin and for an incarnation irrespective of the fall; his
anthropology. Along with Moltmann, Torrance considers the incarnate
Son is the image of God and men and women are made in his
image.66 If this is the way God created men and women then he
did so in conformity to an archetype — Jesus Christ. As the pre-
existent Son has no bodily existence then the incarnation was in the
mind and will of God from before the creation. The incarnation was
logically intended as God’s desire before any notion of sin or fall was
conceived. As Adam, no less than any of his progeny, was created
in the image of the image, and that image is the incarnate Christ,
then the eternal Son had to be incarnated as the Christ in time and
space.67
It is Torrance’s contention that as God created out of love then the
creature is created to participate in the Triune love (perichoresis) in
a creaturely way, which is by grace and not by nature. This is what
leads him to assert the possibility of an incarnation irrespective of
64 See P. Nellas, Deification in Christ, trans. N. Russell (1979. Crestwood, NY.: St
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1987), p. 35.
65 See J.M. Campbell, The Nature of the Atonement (1856. Edinburgh: Handsel Press,
1996), p. 19.
66 For a number of contemporary proposals supporting this thesis see: D. Staniloae, ‘Im-
age, Likeness, and Deification in the Human Person,’ Communio 13 (1986), pp. 64–83; W.
Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 2, trans. G.W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1994), pp. 218–231; and S.J. Grenz, ‘Jesus as the Imago Dei: Image-of-God Christology
and the Non-linear Linearity of Theology,’ Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society
47 no. 4 (2004), pp. 617–628.
67 Torrance refers the reader to J.B. Torrance, and R.C. Walls, John Duns Scotus Doctor
of the Church (Edinburgh: 1992), p. 9, and I. Mackenzie, The Atonement of Time (Norwich,
1994).
C© The author 2008
Journal compilation C© The Dominican Council/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008
On Getting First Things First 361
the fall. Torrance sees in this hypothetical position a deep seated
truth: God’s ultimate purpose is to unite all things to God through
Christ (Col 1.15–20). What Torrance contributes to this discussion
is a further articulation of the ontological, epistemological, and an-
thropological barriers which only God incarnate can bridge. As such,
the prospective or positive elements of the incarnation come to the
fore in Torrance’s theology, something he claims the western church
desperately needs to hear today.
The doctrine of the primacy of Christ is an important one as it
highlights the intention of the triune God to unite men and women
to himself in glorious communion. By participating in the incarnate
Son’s communion with the Father by the Holy Spirit believers are
caught up into immortality, communion, and love. This participation
in the divine nature is consonant with an incarnation irrespective of
the fall, thus with the Scotistic thesis and hypothesis. In light of this
it behoves us to present a piece of modal logic of our own, which
takes heed of Mascall’s advice earlier in the essay to let theological
ideas have ‘a scamper in a field where the paths are few and the
boundaries undefined’.
IV. Modal logic and the possibility of incarnation
What if Adam and Eve had not sinned in the Garden? What sort
of world would we have inherited, and more importantly, what sort
of nature would we have? While it is in the realms of theological
speculation it is not without merit to explore these questions in some
detail. If Adam and Eve had obeyed God in the Garden then it is
generally accepted, especially within the reformation tradition, that
the period of probation68 would have come to an end, and, in the
cool of the day as God walked with our first parents (Gen 3.8) he
would have blessed them for their obedience and invited them to
partake of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil along with
the Tree of Life (Gen 2.9). The theological import of this scenario
is that Adam and Eve, and the human race they represent, would
have come to a knowledge of good and evil through obedience rather
than disobedience, by invitation rather than theft. Because there had
been no fall and thus no corruption, then the rest of their progeny
would not have inherited the guilt, stain, or disease of that original
68 On the idea of probation see C. Hodge, Systematic Theology: Vol. 2: Anthropology
(reprint: Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 117–122; and L. Berkhof, Systematic Theology
(Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1939), 215–218. The covenant idea is also worked out in
a unique way by Barth. See Suh, The Creation-Mediatorship of Jesus Christ, pp. 34–37,
who argues that according to Barth the creation was brought about for the sake of the
covenant, and the covenant was concluded for the sake of reconciliation. See further at
pp. 56–61.
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sin. God, presumably, would have continued to ‘walk’ with humanity
and relate to them in meaningful ways.
References in Genesis to God walking with Adam and Eve are
metaphorical, representing in some undefined way a relationship be-
tween God and themselves. While this relationship would have been
intimate and intensely personal it would still have certain limitations,
as is evident in the Genesis narrative itself. As God is spirit, unlike
human persons, a barrier exists between the Creator and creatures;
the ontological barrier. As God is beyond human comprehension then
another barrier exists between the Creator and creatures; the episte-
mological barrier. Because of these and other ‘barriers’ communion
with God would be intimate but certainly not mature or perfect. One
of the crucial things that would be missing is a knowledge of and an
intimate relationship with the three persons of the Trinity. How can
the creature know the trinitarian God unless that God reveal himself
to them? As blessed and blissful as the vision of life in the Garden
without sin is, there are still some very clear limitations even in this
hypothetical world. Ultimate fellowship with the triune God would
appear to be impossible given these boundaries to communion.
It is at this point that the force and logic of the primacy of Christ
and the concomitant hypothesis of an incarnation irrespective of a fall
is felt the strongest. For creatures to fully know God they have to
experience God in his trinitarian fullness. That experience would have
to be one in which the love of the Father for the Son made possible
by the Holy Spirit was personally experienced along with the Son’s
loving response to the Father in or by the self-same Spirit. How could
this happen without an incarnation? The creature cannot directly
participate in the being of God (theologia or energeia). Without the
incarnation of God himself we could only know God in a secondary
sense. Without the incarnation we could only experience God in an
approximate way. In order to feel and know the love of the Father
for the Son by the Holy Spirit we would literally have to be or
become a divine person – specifically the person of the Son, but this
is impossible. Likewise, in order to lovingly respond to the Father
as the Son does by the Holy Spirit we would once again have to
literally become the Son. But there is only one eternal Son – the one
God has revealed as the incarnate Word, the Lord Jesus Christ.
Unless we commit to a doctrine of divinization in which the crea-
ture literally becomes divine then reconciliation with God is impos-
sible. However, if the creature is somehow included in one of the
trinitarian persons, the eternal and incarnate Son, then they could
experience this trinitarian love in fullness while remaining human,
hence the necessity of stressing the incarnate Son. We may further
hypothesise what would have happened next. In due time God would
have revealed himself as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit by sending his
Son to reveal the nature of God. The Father would then have sent the
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Holy Spirit through the Son to further reveal the trinitarian being of
God. So in the ‘fullness of time’ (at the right time) God would have
sent his Son in the image and likeness of humanity in order to, as
Athanasius famously stated, ‘become like us so that we may become
like him.’69
This brings into relief the question: Which trinitarian person could
most appropriately be incarnated? Along with various theologians of
the tradition we conclude that it was most appropriate for the Son
to become incarnate, not the Father or the Holy Spirit; and for var-
ious reasons.70 In the first place, borrowing an argument from Karl
Rahner, it would be inappropriate for the Father to be incarnated as
this would go against all that the trinitarian monarchia of the Father
stands for and would invert the direction of the subsistent relations
existing between the trinitarian persons.71 In the second place, and
borrowing an argument from Barth, God has elected to create men
and women in his image, an image which is specifically christologi-
cal. Hence the Son is the one who has eternally been determined to
become human, not the sending Father or the empowering Spirit.72
As a result of the Son’s incarnation knowledge of the trinitarian
God is made available thus breaking through the epistemological bar-
rier. The ontological barrier is also overcome through the hypostatic
union in the incarnate Son, via his model and example as humans
come to participate in Christ and through Christ in the trinitarian
69 Athanasius, Letter 60, to Adelphus, 4, in NPNF, 2nd series, 4. pp. 1334–1340.
70 What is not being argued is the impossibility of the other two divine persons being
incarnated. In agreement see Aquinas, Summa Theologiae III, q.23, a. 2., who argues there
is nothing that would restrict the possible incarnation of the Father or the Holy Spirit as all
three share the same eternal divine nature. Duns Scotus argued along similar lines in his
Opera omnia, L. III, d. 1, t, 2. Within Scripture we read of the Father and the Spirit’s active
presence within the creation. The language of Scripture suggests that God the Father can
assume finite form within the order of creation (i.e. ‘the Ancient of Days,’ ‘He who sits
upon the Throne’) — as can the Spirit (‘like a dove’). See A. Funkenstein, ‘The Body of
God in 17th Century Theology and Science,’ in Millenarianism and Messianism in English
Literature and Thought 1650–1800, ed. R.H. Popkin (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), 150–175;
and R.W. Jenson, ‘The Body of God’s Presence: A Trinitarian Theory,’ in Creation, Christ
and Culture: Studies in Honour of T. F. Torrance, ed. R.W. A. McKinney (Edinburgh: T.
& T. Clark, 1976), 85–91.
71 Rahner goes further and rejects the idea a divine person other than the Son could be-
come incarnate for this would, in his opinion, threaten the axiom that the economic Trinity
is the immanent Trinity and vice-versa. K. Rahner, Schriften zur Theologie (Einsiedeln-
Zu¨rich-Ko¯ln: Benzinger Verlag, 1960), 1. p. 203; 4. p. 138; Grundkurs des Glaubens.
Einfu¨hrung in den Begriff des Christentums (Freiburg-Basel-Wien: Herder, 1976), p. 213;
The Trinity, trans. J. Donceel (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), pp. 22–33; and Theological
Investigations vol. 4: More Recent Writings, trans. K. Smyth (London: Darton, Longman
& Todd, 1974), pp. 90–107.
72 Barth, CD IV/1, p. 66. G. O’Collins, ‘The Incarnation – The Critical Issues,’ in The
Incarnation, eds. S.T. Davis, D. Kendall, and G. O’Collins (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002), p. 22, overemphasises his point but helpfully concludes: ‘In short, where
inner-trinitarian relations undoubtedly rule out the possible incarnation of the Father, the
economy of salvation succeeds better in ruling out the possible incarnation of the Spirit.’
C© The author 2008
Journal compilation C© The Dominican Council/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2008
364 On Getting First Things First
being of God by the Spirit. It now becomes possible for humans to
receive the love of the Father in the Son through the Holy Spirit and
then return that love of and in the Son to the Father by the Holy
Spirit. The deeper reality revealed by this incarnational model is that
is it only in Christ that full participation in God is possible. It is
to this end the Spirit baptises, fills, and indwells human persons. It
is to this end the Father sends the Son. It is to this end the Son
willingly goes and lives his life, the one for the many; and all this
regardless of sin or a fall in the first instance. It is this incarnational
and relational goal, not simply the forgiveness of human sinfulness,
which provides the rationale for the primacy of Christ. Christ came
to establish a right relationship between the Creator and the creature,
and that necessitated the incarnation of the Son.
By spending some time developing this hypothetical model we end
up affirming many of the insights that the New Testament itself as-
serts as being true according to our post-lapsarian world, a world in
which atonement becomes a necessity. For human creatures to partici-
pate in the divine nature, according to the promise of 2 Pt 1.4, several
barriers are required to be bridged: the ontological; the epistemolog-
ical; and the relational. Sin has merely frustrated and intensified the
disunity between Creator and creature. This does not imply, however,
that the incarnational model hypothesised so far is unnecessary. What
it does highlight is that this model is fully complementary with the
juridical or atonement based model of the incarnation developed al-
most exclusively in the West. It is our conviction that when the two
models — incarnation and atonement — are united they will enable
a much fuller and more comprehensive picture of God’s revelation,
one that stands closer to Scripture as well as Eastern and Western
concerns.
Myk Habets
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